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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the role of banking supervision, measured in terms of enforcement 
outputs (i.e., on-site audits and sanctions) in containing bank risk-taking. Our results on the 
direct banking supervision–risk-taking correlation show an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between on-site audits and bank risk, while the nexus between enforcement actions and risk 
appears linear and negative. With respect to the combined effect of efficient supervision and 
banking regulation (in the form of capital and transparency requirements) we find that 
effective supervision and disclosure prerequisites are important and complementary 
mechanisms in reducing bank fragility, by contrast to capital requirements which are proven 
rather futile in controlling bank risk, even when supplemented with a higher volume of on-
site audits and enforcement actions.  
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1. Introduction 
The recent financial turmoil has stimulated substantial research attempting to identify 
the reasons of the crisis and propose recovery measures. A handful of more or less 
interrelated explanations have been proposed,1 but one of the most interesting that has been 
consistently gaining ground involves supervisory inertia (e.g., Blanchard, 2008; Caprio et al., 
2008). Spurred by this reorientation of theoretical discussion towards the efficiency of 
banking supervision,2 our paper investigates empirically the relationship between supervisory 
effectiveness (or supervisory alertness) and banks’ risk-taking incentives.  
Provoked by the papers of Jackson (2005), Jackson and Roe (2008) and Coffee 
(2007) we determine supervisory effectiveness by measuring enforcement outputs through 
the employment of data on enforcement actions (sanctions) and on-site audits. We believe 
that the use of enforcement outputs allows us to capture the effectiveness-alertness of bank 
supervisors in a more direct and precise manner in comparison to previous research that 
primarily focuses on law-on-the books indices (e.g., official investigatory powers and 
supervisory independence as reflected on law on the books) or somehow secondary-
nonspecific measures (e.g., general “rule of law” and “government efficiency” indices 
generated on the basis of private rating agencies’ evaluations).  To this end, we build a new 
panel dataset that contains information on on-site audits and enforcement actions for 17 
countries over the period 1998-2007. This period begins after the Asian and Russian 
financial crises and ends in the dawn of the recent financial turmoil, thus providing ample 
room to identify whether the effectiveness of banking supervision is related to the increased 
risk-taking by banks observed in recent years. As such, this paper examines first and 
foremost whether on-site audits and enforcement actions have a negative and direct impact 
on bank risk-taking. Phrased differently, we ask whether supervisors that inspect banks more 
regularly and adopt a more forceful enforcement attitude are better positioned to restrain 
banks’ risk-taking appetite. 
At a derivative level, we examine the interrelation between the quality of banking 
supervision and the other two pillars of Basel II, namely capital adequacy requirements and 
market discipline-transparency. More specifically, we seek to assess whether it is the 
effective enforcement of the capital adequacy and disclosure regulation that is principally of 
essence to constrain banks’ risky behavior. Two reflections have inspired this latter objective 
of the paper. First, according to the prevailing perception mainly instigated by the notorious 
law and finance research of La Porta et al. (e.g., 1998 and 2006), common law countries 
appear to outperform civil law countries as far as regulatory and supervisory quality in the 
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financial services field is concerned. Somehow paradoxically, nonetheless, it is precisely the 
core of the common law system, i.e., US and UK that originated and suffered the most from 
the current financial turmoil. We are concerned, therefore, that the proxies used by empirical 
research for supervisory quality could only capture formal-de jure as opposed to actual-de 
facto supervisory alertness. Second, we are aware that a considerable amount of empirical 
research examines the effect of banking regulation pertaining to capital requirements and 
market discipline on bank risk-taking, yet the results are rather mixed. After briefly 
reviewing the relevant literature, we discern that is it mainly the direct effect of banking 
regulation indices on various proxies of bank risk or capitalization that is scrutinized. 
Consequently, we have reasons to suspect that the aforementioned inconclusive findings 
could be partially attributed to the different level of supervisory effectiveness across 
countries. It seems interesting, therefore, to analyze the combined effect of banking 
regulation and supervision on bank risk.   
From this perspective, our research is different from most of the contemporary 
literature that separates the three Basel II components and seeks to study the independent 
impact that each one of these has on banking stability or performance. Our research approach 
is not only in harmony with but, at the same time, constitutes an evaluation of the rather 
neglected guiding principle adopted by the Basel Committee (Basel Committee, 2006) 
according to which market discipline (Pillar 3) supplements both minimum capital adequacy 
requirements (Pillar 1) and the supervisory review process (Pillar 2). The Basel Committee 
has taken the unambiguous position that the three pillars should not be viewed as being 
distinct initiatives but rather as complementary parts of the general attempt to enhance the 
capital adequacy framework and its overall effectiveness and operation (Basel Committee, 
2000). Indeed, improved disclosure allows both market participants and supervisors to assess 
key pieces of information on the capital adequacy of banks (especially after considering that 
Basel II provides for the use of internal methodologies in calculating capital requirements), 
thus allowing better monitoring of risky conduct. 
In an effort to examine (i) the direct effect of banking supervision and (ii) its 
combined effect with banking regulations (i.e., capital and transparency requirements) on 
bank risk, we use bank-level data to measure risk. Risk is measured in terms of both risk of 
default (Z-index) and credit risk. The estimation results indicate that the impact of on-site 
examinations on either measure of bank risk is non-linear. A remarkable finding is that the 
threshold level of audits beyond which its relationship with risk becomes negative is quite 
higher than the average number of examinations per bank actually taking place in most 
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western-type countries. In contrast, enforcement actions exert a linear negative impact on 
risk. Turning our attention to the effect of interplay between banking regulation, supervision 
and risk we obtain two appealing inferences for regulatory and supervisory policy-making. 
First, it appears that transparency regulation exercises a significant disciplinary effect upon 
banks’ risk-taking appetite both directly and when viewed in a combined fashion with 
effective banking supervision. Second, and quite surprisingly, our results fail to establish a 
similar correlation for capital adequacy requirements, that is, capital regulation, either 
directly or through its effective supervision, does not seem to significantly curtail risk-taking 
by banks. Essentially, our findings purport that regulatory and supervisory insistence on 
capital vis a vis transparency regulation rather exaggerates and, as a result, the pendulum of 
regulatory and supervisory attention should swing towards enhancing market discipline.  
The rest of this paper is organized along the following lines. Section 2 comments on 
the related literature and the theoretical background and forms explicitly the research 
questions. Section 3 describes the sample and variables to be used in the empirical analysis. 
In Section 4 the direct impact of banking supervision on bank risk-taking is analyzed. Section 
5 considers the combined effect of banking supervision and banking regulations on bank risk. 
Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.       
 
2. Related literature and theoretical underpinnings 
To set the discussion in context and construct our basic research questions, we offer a 
brief literature review of the literature that is associated with our work.   
 
2.1. The disciplinary effect of banking supervisory enforcement 
The amount of research empirically investigating the disciplinary effect of on-site 
banking audits has been fairly ample. Wu (1969) has probably been the first to notice that 
bank examiners’ criticisms on business loans are reasonably accurate, thus offering a good ex 
ante measure of loan quality. Wu’s statement has been corroborated ever since by several 
studies focusing on the predictive and corrective character of bank examinations regarding 
loans’ quality (e.g., Berger et al., 2000; DeYoung et al., 2001; Bhattacharya et al., 2002; 
Gunther and Moore, 2003). All of them tend to reach the general conclusion that on-site 
audits exercise a disciplinary power upon banks principally in three ways. First, they force 
the production of more accurate financial reports on the part of examined banks. Second, 
they enhance market discipline through public disclosure of the audits’ findings. And, third, 
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they improve supervisory discipline as audits’ discoveries may form the basis for the 
application of remedial actions by supervisory authorities.  
 In contrast, the empirical research focusing directly on the impact of supervisory 
sanctions upon banking discipline has been exceptionally scarce – not to say non-existent. In 
fact, the importance of official, supervisory remedies has predominantly been elaborated on a 
theoretical root via the lens of the general law and compliance theory or approached in an 
indirect manner by part of the aforementioned research concerning on-site audits. From the 
theoretical standpoint, the materialization of legal standards (law on the books) through the 
employment of effective corrective measures is viewed as the means that gives the law “teeth 
to bite” and offers meaning to the otherwise “blank letter” of legal rules (e.g., Black, 2001; 
Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002). Swindle (1995), DeYoung et al. (2001) and Prescott (2004), 
among others, make the critical remark that the positive relationship between the frequency 
of on-site audits and banking discipline could be traced in several links, one of which is the 
fact that the information gained by supervisors following examinations enables them to 
impose direct costs upon imprudent banks through the application of appropriate remedial 
measures. A slight variation of the above argument is that on-site audits may transmit to the 
market “regulatory discipline information”. In other words, an unanticipated change of rating 
accompanied by regulatory restrictions or relieves, depending on the direction of the rating, 
may affect bank value. In the event of a rating downgrade and concomitant introduction of 
regulatory restrictions, the value of the bank is likely to decrease thus exerting disciplining 
power (Berger and Davies, 1998). 
 All in all, the research suggests that the frequency of on-site audits and the number of 
supervisory sanctions should have a positive correlation with banking discipline. On this 
basis we can formulate our first empirical question as follows:   
 
Question 1: Is the quality of supervisory enforcement, dictated as the number of on-site 
audits and sanctions, negatively associated with bank risk-taking?  
   
2.2. The interrelation between banking stability, supervisory effectiveness and banking 
regulation 
As already discussed, consistent with the contemporary research and regulatory trend, 
our work employs a more integrated approach concerning the interplay between banking 
supervision and regulation. To put it another way, besides exploring the direct effect of 
enforcement on bank risk, we also attempt to offer a more integrated approach of the three 
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Basel II ingredients by studying whether it is the efficient supervision (Pillar 2) of capital 
adequacy (Pillar 1) and transparency (Pillar 2) regulation, in particular, that has a bearing on 
banking stability. From this perspective, our work appears to be also related with that string 
of literature focusing on the direct relationship between banking regulation in the form of 
capital adequacy and disclosure requirements, on the one hand, and banking fragility, on the 
other hand.3  
A respectable division of the research shares the view that increased transparency and 
the concomitant enhanced market discipline contribute significantly to the safeguarding of 
banking stability by limiting informational asymmetries, boosting private monitoring, 
facilitating supervisory oversight and thus forcing banks to adopt a more prudent risk-taking 
behavior (e.g., Beck et al., 2006; Nier and Baumann, 2006). Others, however, appear rather 
unconvinced, offering at least two reasons for such distrust. First, and considering that the 
returns of banks are positively correlated, increased disclosure of information may undermine 
banking system fragility as depositors may overreact to adverse information about other 
banks and initiate a run on their bank (e.g., Chen and Hasan, 2006). Second, compliance with 
information disclosure regulation not only entails direct (e.g., establishing and operating 
efficient information production and verification systems) and indirect (e.g., appropriation of 
disclosed information by rivals) costs, but may also reduce financial stability, as information 
leakage leads to pervasive free-riding of monitoring information and, by implication, to 
reduced profit margins (Hyytinen and Takalo, 2002).4 
 The literature on the relationship between capital adequacy regulation and banking 
stability is voluminous, yet the results are again mixed. The conventional view holds that 
capital adequacy regulation – especially concerning risk-weighted capital requirements – 
promotes banking stability in two ways: it serves as a cushion against unanticipated losses 
that threaten the solvency of banks and reduces banks’ risk-taking appetite by forcing the 
rebalancing of banks’ portfolio in favor of safer assets (e.g., Furlong and Keeley, 1989; 
Cuoco and Liu, 2006). On the other hand, another part of the literature seems to display less 
enthusiasm, contesting that risk-independent capital requirements may cause banks to hold a 
non-optimal asset portfolio as they are agnostic to the individual banks’ different preference 
structures and allow risk-loving banks to bypass the restrictions via financial leverage and/or 
business risk (e.g., Kim and Santomero, 1988). Furthermore, issuing equity to satisfy 
mandatory capital standards may lead to dilution of insiders’ ownership and a fall of banks’ 
stock price and market value, thus inciting supervisory authorities to abstain from effectively 
enforcing capital regulation (Besanko and Kanatas, 1996). Third, it may be the case that 
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capital adequacy requirements increase risk. As capital regulation reduces future profits, 
banks have diminished incentives to avoid default since they have less to lose in the case of 
bankruptcy; moreover, considering that capital rules elevate the value of equity to the banks, 
the latter are incited to increase risk today in order to acquire a higher amount of equity 
tomorrow in case of success (Blum, 1999).5      
 All things considered, therefore, the empirical and theoretical literature seems to have 
failed to reach consensus regarding the direct impact of capital regulation and disclosure 
requirements on banking stability. We contend that a field that probably deserves more 
attention as a possible explanatory factor of the diverse research outcomes is the role of 
enforcement of the aforementioned types of banking regulation. Empirical and theoretical 
research has now been progressively shifting its attention to examining the interplay between 
supervisory-enforcement quality, banking regulation (capital and transparency requirements) 
and banking fragility. In this context, the work of Gilbert (1991) and Swindle (1995) is 
particularly stimulating as they find that the impact of capital regulation depends on the 
quality of enforcement, which is not uniform across different supervisory authorities. On the 
same line, Decamps et al. (2004) conclude that market discipline is a useful complement to 
supervision and capital requirements: indirect market discipline (i.e., signals provided by 
market prices of banks’ securities) can modulate the intensity of supervisory interventions – 
with the exception of periods of crisis where prices become erratic –, while direct market 
discipline (i.e., modifying the liability structure of banks) can be effective provided that 
banking supervisors are protected from political interference. Breuer (2004) suggests that 
regulatory and supervisory improvements alone cannot reduce financial system risk unless 
they are complemented by accurate and timely information on banks’ status. Moreover, as 
sustained by Flannery and Thakor (2006), there are interesting linkages between 
informational transparency, regulatory supervision and capital requirements, with the former 
facilitating supervision and impinging on the design of capital requirements. Van Hoose 
(2007) reaches the interesting conclusion that capital regulation does not necessarily produce 
a regulator’s preferred outcome if not accompanied by supervisory or market discipline, with 
Blum (2008) reporting that truthful revelation of banks’ risks presumes that supervisors are 
able to detect and sanction dishonest banks. Finally, Borio and Zhu (2008) notice that, 
despite its increasing importance, research on the interaction between capital regulation and 
supervision and their influence on the behavior of the financial system is still rather limited. 
After considering the aforementioned theoretical and empirical discussion, we 
assume that it would be interesting and novel to examine the combined effect of supervisory 
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enforcement (i.e., on-site audits and sanctions) and banking regulation (i.e., capital and 
transparency requirements) on bank risk-taking. Thus, our second research question is 
formulated as follows: 
 
Question 2: Is the combined effect of effective supervisory enforcement and banking 
regulation, in the form of capital and transparency requirements, important in shaping bank 
risk-taking appetite? 
 
3. Data 
As already underlined, a core innovation of our work refers to the construction and 
employment of a new proxy for supervisory quality that has been based on enforcement 
outputs. More specifically, in measuring supervisory effectiveness, our study concentrates 
upon the enforcement constituent of supervision through the collection and elaboration of 
data on banking supervisory authorities’ remedial measures (sanctions) and on-site 
inspections. We build a new dataset that encompasses information on sanctions and on-site 
bank examinations in seventeen countries over the period 1998-2007. The countries included 
are Australia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Korea, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine and USA. The 
choice of these countries is motivated by the availability of data on examinations and 
sanctions, as well as from the fact that they are representative of banking systems with 
different legal, regulatory and institutional origins. The latter element enhances the richness 
and variability of our data. Bank risk is captured at the bank level, which yields richer 
information on individual bank strategies.  
Information by country on the average number of supervised banks during the sample 
period and the actual number of banks for which the risk indicators are constructed is 
included in Table 1.6 All data for the bank-level variables are collected from Bankscope. We 
limit the empirical analysis to the unconsolidated statements of banks in order to reduce the 
possibility of introducing aggregation bias in the results. Only supervised banks are included 
in the sample and the percentage of banks in the sample to the total number of banks 
supervised is approximately equal to 76 per cent. During the sample period a number of 
M&As and bank failures took place, which are taken into account in our dataset so as to 
avoid selectivity bias. Also, the data were reviewed for reporting errors or other 
inconsistencies (zero or negative values for the variables used) and some observations are 
excluded accordingly. 
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 3.1. On-site examinations and sanctions 
Data on on-site audits and supervisory enforcement actions are obtained from the 
annual reports produced by the national supervisory authorities that are responsible for the 
conduct of banking supervision within each jurisdiction (the supervisory authorities for each 
country are reported in Table 1). The actual variables employed are constructed as the 
number of on-site audits and sanctions per bank in the supervisory jurisdiction in each 
country, in each year. This is the first study that employs a panel of cross-country data for 
these variables.7 The panel for these variables is unbalanced and consists of 145 
observations. Note that we encapsulate actual-de facto banking supervisory effectiveness by 
employing data from on-site examinations and enforcement actions. We have valid reasons 
to believe that, by gauging enforcement outputs, we are able to capture supervisory 
effectiveness in a more accurate and pragmatic manner.  
More specifically, the pioneering work of Jackson (2005) and Jackson and Roe 
(2008) acknowledges that the enforcement inputs that they use (i.e., regulatory budgets and 
staffing) provide a rough approximation of supervisory efficiency due to inherent problems 
concerning data inconsistency and completeness. In this context, it is suggested that it would 
be more useful to “collect information on the actual enforcement activities” including 
enforcement actions and on-site examinations (Jackson and Roe, 2008). Second, enforcement 
inputs do not tell the full story about supervisory efficiency, as even adequately-funded 
supervisors may well be “captured” by the regulated entities and thus display enforcement 
sluggishness (Coffee, 2007).  
Owing to the lack of data, related works so far have been attempting to approach 
supervisory effectiveness in an indirect manner. For example, La Porta et al. (2006) measure 
“public enforcement quality” in securities markets by examining five official attributes of 
supervisory authorities (i.e., independence, dismissal of supervisors’ key members, range of 
supervised sectors, power to promulgate regulations, scope of supervisory-investigatory 
powers, ability to impose non-criminal and criminal sanctions). Yet, as the data is derived 
from law on the books, the results merely capture formal-de jure supervisory effectiveness as 
opposed to actual-de facto supervisory alertness (Jackson and Roe, 2008).8 The same goes 
for the papers of Neyapti and Dincer (2005) and Dincer and Neyapti (2008) measuring the 
quality of banking supervision. The work of Noy (2004) should also fall within the same 
methodological division as it measures supervisory quality via the employment of three 
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different proxies, namely, the degree of corruption, the state of political freedom and the 
level of Central Bank independence.   
A different method that has been used to assess supervisory quality is through the 
employment of surveys-questionnaires (e.g., Claessens, 1996; Barth et al., 2001 and 2004; 
2008). Without any intention whatsoever to underestimate the contribution of this seminal 
string of literature, it would be plausible to assume that the answers and the assignment of 
scores unavoidably entail some degree of judgment and cannot accurately capture actual 
implementation of law on the books. On the other hand, however, it is worth noticing that the 
aforementioned measures provide an excellent proxy for the regulatory and supervisory 
environment (law on the books), hence they will be employed in the empirical analysis that 
follows as a proxy for the regulatory environment. 
Τhe estimations that have been made jointly by the IMF and the World Bank for the 
Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) to measure supervisory effectiveness and 
which have been employed by a noteworthy part of the literature (e.g., Sundararajan et al., 
2001; Čihák and Tieman, 2008) occupy a somehow middle ground between evaluating the 
letter of the law and utilizing surveys. The IMF and the World Bank consider that examining 
the degree of compliance with the 25 Basel Committee Core Principles for effective banking 
supervision (“Basel Core Principles”, “BCPs”) constitutes a reliable benchmark against 
which the effectiveness of bank supervisory regimes can be assessed. To this end, the FSAP 
involves assessments of the letter of law while also requiring examiners to meet with 
supervisors and private sector participants in conjunction with third party expert review of 
the draft assessments. Nonetheless, in attempting to strike the aforementioned delicate 
balance between the two research methodologies, the FSAP appears to borrow, to a certain 
extent, the shortcomings of each of them; that is, an element of rigidity and incompleteness 
as a result of ignoring enforcement of formal rules and an aspect of subjectivity due to the 
intervention of experts’ opinions. In addition, striving to assess compliance with inherently 
vague and broadly drafted principles like those of the BCPs leaves much room for 
manoeuvre and different interpretations, thus casting doubt on the reliability of the final 
evaluations (Das and Quintyn, 2002). 
Our intuition to select data for the remedial measures imposed and on-site inspections 
conducted by banking supervisory authorities as a substitute for the efficacy of enforcement 
and, by extension, of supervisory effectiveness is consistent with our objective to capture 
actual-de facto supervisory alertness and is further supported by both Basel II and relevant 
research. According to the second pillar of the Basel II, supervisory review is expected to 
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assess banks’ internal capital adequacy assessments and strategies, risk management and 
control systems, as well as credit institutions’ ability to monitor and ensure compliance with 
regulatory capital ratios (Basel Committee, 2006). To this end, supervisory review should 
involve some combination of on- and off-site inspections, discussions with bank 
management, review of external auditors’ work and periodic reporting. In case that 
supervisors are not satisfied with the result of the review process, appropriate remedial 
measures should be taken making use of the formal enforcement powers conferred upon 
them (Hüpkes et al., 2005; Basel Committee, 2006). On-site inspections, in particular, 
occupy a central position within the supervisory arsenal, as they enable supervisors to detect 
signs of management deficiencies before financial performance deteriorates, while also 
providing independent verification of both internal control/ risk management systems’ 
quality and the reliability of information produced by banks (Basel Committee, 2002; 
Bernanke, 2006). It should come as no surprise, therefore, that on-site examinations along 
with off-site monitoring and enforcement actions are considered as the main tools that 
supervisors enjoy in order to ensure the stability of the system (Quintyn and Taylor, 2002). 
 
3.2. Bank risk-taking 
We proxy the risk-taking behavior of banks by both the ratio of non-performing loans 
to total loans (npl) and the Z-index, in alternative specifications. The first measure reflects 
the quality of bank assets, i.e., the potential adverse exposure to earnings and asset market 
values owing to deteriorating asset quality. Since a portion of non-performing loans will 
probably result in losses for the bank, a high value for this ratio is unwanted. In fact, the 
higher this ratio the more capital a bank normally requires supporting the loan portfolio. It is 
thought that a target number for this variable is 1.5 per cent; however, the trend is the most 
important factor to observe because bank risk is inherently dynamic in nature. Data for this 
variable are obtained from Bankscope and descriptive statistics are given in Table 2. The 
mean value equals 0.023, with countries like Bulgaria, Romania, Hong Kong and Korea 
obtaining high values in the beginning of the sample period9 and countries like Australia and 
Germany having the lower npl ratios. 
The Z-index, in turn, represents a more universal measure of bank risk-taking and is 
defined as ( ) / ( )Z ROA EA ROAσ= + , where ROA is the rate of return on assets, EA is the 
ratio of equity to assets and σ(ROA) is an estimate of the standard deviation of the rate of 
return on assets. To calculate the standard deviation of ROA we use data on ROA from the 
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two previous years and we verified that using three or four years produces very similar 
results. The particular risk measure is monotonically associated with a measure of bank’s 
probability of failure and has been widely used in the empirical banking and finance 
literature (e.g., Boyd et al., 2006). A higher Z indicates that the bank is more stable (more 
distant from insolvency). Since Z is highly skewed, we use its natural logarithm, which is 
normally distributed. Z obtains a mean value equal to 3.81 in our sample. The correlation of 
the Z-score with npl is negative and takes a value of -0.689, while low Z-scores are reported 
in countries with high credit risk (e.g., the Asian countries in the first years of our sample and 
some transition countries). High average Z-scores are reported in 2006 owing to high 
profitability.10    
In additional robustness checks we confirmed our baseline results when using other 
measures of risk such as the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans or the simple volatility 
of the return on assets σ(ROA). The first measure reflects the adequacy of provisions to cover 
potential loan losses. The advantage of using this variable is that it incorporates banks’ 
forecasts about future levels of credit risk. Yet, a potential disadvantage is that provisioning 
rules differ between countries, so that observed data may not be directly comparable across 
banks. σ(ROA), in turn, is more useful in studies that seek to separate the volatility of assets 
from the volatility of leverage. Therefore, we report the results on the basis of npl and Z, 
while the rest of the regressions are available on request.     
 
3.3. Capital requirements and market discipline 
In order to quantify capital and transparency requirements we use the approach 
followed by Barth et al. (2001).11 We briefly discuss these indices below, while additional 
information can be found in Appendix A.  
The first index (caprq) shows the extent of both initial and overall capital stringency. 
Initial capital stringency refers to whether the sources of funds counted as regulatory capital 
can include assets other than cash or government securities and borrowed funds, as well as 
whether the regulatory or supervisory authorities verify these sources. Overall capital 
stringency indicates whether risk elements and value losses are considered while calculating 
the regulatory capital. Higher values of caprq indicate more stringent capital requirements. 
The second index (mdisc) reflects the degree to which banks are forced to disclose accurate 
information to the public (e.g., disclosure of off-balance sheet items, risk management 
procedures, etc.) and whether there are incentives to increase market discipline, for example, 
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via the issuance of subordinated debt and the abolition of deposit insurance schemes. 
Descriptive statistics for these variables are reported in Table 2.  
 
3.4. Other bank- and country-level control variables 
 In the estimated equations we control for a number of bank- and country-level 
variables (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics). At the bank-level we control for liquidity 
using the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. Banks with higher liquid assets have a less risky 
portfolio and thus a lower value of non-performing loans. However, these banks may also be 
less profitable as risk-free assets do not offer yield and, therefore, high liquidity may be 
associated with lower Z-scores. Moreover, if liquidity standards are in place then banks may 
have incentives to take on higher risks, which is a behavior consistent with a moral hazard 
generation mechanism. An additional bank-specific control variable is bank size, which is 
proxied by the natural logarithm of real total assets. Larger banks are usually more profitable 
owing to economies of scale and/or possible market power in loans or deposits. As a result, 
we expect a positive association between bank size and the Z-score. Nonetheless, larger 
banks may also have incentives to increase their credit risk if they consider themselves to be 
in the “too-big-to-fail” group of banks. Consequently, the impact of size on credit risk is 
ambiguous.  
 In connection with the variables pertaining to the institutional, regulatory and 
macroeconomic environment, we employ an index of economic freedom (obtained from the 
Heritage Foundation), which is designed to measure the degree to which a nation’s policies 
and institutions protect economic freedom. In addition, we control for the level of economic 
development using the real GDP per capita and for price stability and monetary conditions 
using the inflation rate (both these variables are taken from the World Development 
Indicators).  
Finally, we control for restrictions on bank activities, which is again constructed on 
the basis of the Barth et al. (2001) approach. The latter index (we name it actrs) is 
determined by considering whether securities, insurance, real estate activities and ownership 
of non-financial firms are unrestricted, permitted, restricted or prohibited (for more 
information, please refer to the Appendix). Theoretical literature has identified both 
advantages and disadvantages in allowing banks to offer a wide range of financial services, 
with the emphasis being placed on the provision of investment services (e.g., Gande, 2008). 
First, conflicts of interests may arise as banks may misstate a borrower’s quality and 
underwrite securities at inflated prices in order to service outstanding loans, as well as 
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misguide their depositors to acquire such securities (e.g., Kang and Liu, 2007). Furthermore, 
banking stability may be undermined as entry into new business lines also gives rise to new 
types of risks for banks (e.g., John et al., 1994; Boyd et al., 1998). On the other hand, 
however, the preponderance of empirical research not only appears to negate the contention 
regarding the emergence of conflicts of interests (e.g., Ang and Richardson, 1994; Kroszner 
and Rajan, 1994), but also suggests that, in the course of monitoring their loans, banks obtain 
valuable information placing them in a unique position to certify the issuance of securities by 
their clients (e.g., Puri, 1996). Moreover, integrated banks may enjoy economies of scale and 
scope in the combined provision of banking and investment services (e.g., Ramírez, 2002), 
and also become more stable as a result of wider asset diversification (e.g., White, 1986; 
Benston, 1989; Barth et al., 2004; Angkinand, 2009). We examine which impact prevails in 
the empirical analysis that follows.    
 
4. The direct impact of banking supervision on bank risk  
4.1. Estimation method 
 Given the considerations discussed above, the direct relationship between banking 
supervision and bank risk-taking is examined in terms of the following equation: 
1 1 2 3 1 4 5it it t t t it t itr r audits sanctions reg b c uα δ β β β β β− −= + + + + + + +     (1) 
where the risk variable r of bank i at time t is written as a function of the lagged dependent 
variable; time-dependent variables audits and sanctions that correspond to the number of on-
site examinations and sanctions per bank  in each year (in logarithmic terms); the indices that 
reflect the regulatory conditions in the banking systems examined, reg; a vector of bank-level 
control variables, b; variables that capture the institutional and macroeconomic conditions 
common to all banks, c; and the error term u. Correlations between the variables used in Eq. 
(1) are not high enough so as to have multicollinearity problems (see Table 3). This is 
interesting as regards the audits and sanctions variables, as it implies that these variables – 
even though positively correlated – do not capture the same aspect of enforcement.  
 We should note here that potentially new regulatory initiatives are unlikely to affect 
the risk-taking behavior of banks in the immediate term. If regulations do affect risk-taking 
incentives, then it is expected that there are lags between adopting new banking laws or 
taking new policy initiatives (that will be reflected in the corresponding indices) and the time 
that these laws or initiatives are materialized into more sound banking practices. Therefore, 
to the very best, the regulatory practices of the previous period are expected to impact the 
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contemporaneous level of bank risk-taking. In fact, in the estimations below, we will be 
using both the first and the second lags of the regulation variables to ensure robustness of the 
results. 
A traditional econometric concern in a simple regression of bank risk is the potential 
endogeneity of some of the right-hand side variables. In the context of the present analysis, 
these concerns are well-justified if one considers that a history of high bank risk may force 
supervisors to improve the quality of enforcement at some point in time. The opposite may 
also be true: in the presence of a prolonged period of prudent risk-taking banking behaviour 
and stable financial and economic environment, supervisory authorities may become more 
lax in enforcing banking regulations, thereby raising banks’ incentives to increase their risk-
taking activities. In these cases, endogenous effects prevail and OLS estimation of Eq. (1) 
would produce biased estimates.  
Another element of potential estimation bias in calculating risk equations is the fact 
that bank-level risk tends to persist. At least four theoretical reasons can be provided to 
backup these dynamics. First, persistence may reflect the existence of intense competition, 
which tends to alleviate the risk-taking of banks (e.g., Keeley, 1990; Cordella and Yeyati, 
2002). Second, relationship-banking with risky borrowers will have a lasting effect on the 
levels of bank risk-taking, despite the fact that dealing repeatedly with the same customer 
will improve efficiency. A similar mechanism would prevail if bank networks are in place or 
if the banking industry is opaque. Third, to the extent that bank risk is associated with the 
phase of the business cycle, banks may require time to smooth the effects of macroeconomic 
shocks. Fourth, risks may persist owing to regulation. In particular, deposit guarantees or 
capital requirements may exacerbate moral hazard issues leading to inefficient and risky 
investments over a considerable period of time. Finally, above and beyond the 
aforementioned theoretical considerations, the potential impact of stock variables on flow 
variables may be better approximated by a dynamic formulation. 
Within this framework the choice of a dynamic empirical model (i.e., one including a 
lagged dependent variable) is well-justified, and the coefficient on the lagged risk variable δ 
may be viewed as the speed of convergence to equilibrium. A value of δ statistically equal to 
0 implies that bank risk is characterized by high speed of adjustment, while a value 
statistically equal to 1 means that the adjustment is very slow. Values between 0 and 1 
suggest that risk persists, but will eventually return to its normal (average) level. Finally, δ 
takes implausible (negative) values if convergence to equilibrium cannot be achieved, which 
probably indicates a problem with the dataset (i.e., very small time dimension of the panel).12
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Given the above, we start with an OLS estimation of Eq. (1), but we resort to the 
system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) for inferences. Besides 
accounting for the specified dynamics, the latter estimator has two additional virtues. First, it 
does not break down in the presence of unit roots (for a proof see Binder et al., 2003); and, 
second, it accommodates the possible endogeneity between the risk and enforcement 
variables by means of appropriate instruments. The second and third lags of the dependent, 
enforcement (audits and sanctions), regulatory13 and bank-level variables serve as 
instruments. Treating these independent variables symmetrically with the dependent implies 
that they are assumed to be endogenous, which, essentially, is in line with the theoretical 
discussion above. In addition, we use the first, second and third lags of the GDP per capita 
and inflation variables as instruments. This treatment of the macroeconomic variables 
corresponds to the assumption that banks and regulators choose their strategy when they 
observe the state of the economic environment at the beginning of the period (i.e., the 
macroeconomic variables are treated as predetermined). Longer lags of the variables are not 
included because, in that case, the estimated equations are overidentified. All in all, by 
providing a series of tests, we show that (i) the estimates are robust, (ii) the equations are not 
overidentified and (iii) the series are not autocorrelated. 
 
4.2. Estimation results  
The results from estimating Eq. (1) are provided in Table 4. Equations I-IV include 
the results of the Z-score regressions and equations V-VIII the results of the npl ones. 
Specifications I and V are estimated using OLS, wile the rest of the equations are estimated 
using the GMM method described above. The OLS regressions pose an immediate challenge 
since most of the control variables appear statistically insignificant, thus contradicting our 
theoretical priors as regards these variables. In contrast, the results based on the GMM 
method are more appealing, while the specification tests imply that the equations are well-
specified. In particular, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable seems to persist to a 
moderate extent, implying that risk will eventually return to its normal (average) level (see 
discussion above). The Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions rejects the relevant 
hypothesis, thus suggesting that the instruments used are valid. Even though some of the 
equations indicate that first-order autocorrelation (AR1) is present, this does not indicate that 
the estimates are inconsistent. Inconsistency would be implied if second-order 
autocorrelation was present (Blundell and Bond, 1998), but this case is rejected by the test 
for AR2 errors. 
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The results of the Z-score and the npl equations are very similar in terms of inference 
and the coefficients usually bear the expected sign. An exception is the coefficient on audits 
in equations II and VI, which shows that on-site examinations do not have a significant 
impact on the Z-index, while they have a positive effect on credit risk. This result is 
counterintuitive and, therefore, we opt for a deeper investigation of the impact of on-site 
examinations in specifications III, IV, VII and VIII. In particular, we consider the existence 
of non-linearity in the effect of on-site audits on bank risk. Indeed, the results show that the 
relationship between audits and bank risk variables is non-linear (U-shaped in the Z-index 
regressions and inverted U-shaped in the npl ones). Increased sanctions, on the other hand, 
have a negative and highly significant effect on bank risk, a finding that remains constant 
among all alternative GMM regressions. Note that we have examined whether the pattern in 
the sanctions-risk relationship is also non-linear, yet no such evidence is found (the squared 
term of sanctions is insignificant).14   
Our results lead to appealing conclusions for policy-makers and supervisors alike. 
First, it appears that enforcement actions do have a statistically significant disciplinary effect 
upon banks. Therefore, it is corroborated that by imposing direct or reputation costs upon 
banks, supervisory sanctions contribute considerably to constraining banks’ risk-taking 
appetite. On the other hand, our inference on the inverted U-shaped relationship between on-
site audits and banking fragility confirms the perception that the frequency of examinations 
holds the key. It seems that on-site audits have a negative effect upon risk-taking when their 
number exceeds a certain threshold. This is either because banks are considering that they 
have been placed at the spotlight by supervisors – which essentially increases the probability 
of becoming subject to enforcement actions – or because the market may become suspicious 
as a result of the intense supervisory scrutiny. In fact, this threshold can be calculated by the 
absolute value of the ratio of 1β  over two times the coefficient on the squared term of audits. 
This derivative gives a value of 2.18 audits per bank for specification III, 2.12 for 
specification IV, 2.06 for specification VII and 2.36 for specification VIII. Note that the 
average value from the four specifications is 2.18, which is higher than the mean audits per 
bank observed in most countries of our sample (see Table 1). Very interestingly, it seems that 
in the US, where the origins of the recent financial turmoil are traced, the number of on-site 
examinations per bank has been gradually diminishing from 0.81 in 2005 to 0.79 in 2006 and 
0.74 in 2007. Essentially, one cannot resist the temptation to argue that one of the causes for 
the ongoing subprime crisis has been the lack of adequate, “preventive” auditing of the US 
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banking system; on the same line, it appears that supervisors should consider to substantially 
increase the number of on-site examinations (close to the number of two per bank every year 
according to our sample) if they see in them an effective mechanism to condense either the 
risk of default or credit risk. Conclusively, our results offer an unequivocal “yes” to Question 
1 as far as the impact of enforcement actions is concerned and a qualified defense in the form 
of an inverted U-shaped relationship concerning the relationship between on-site audits and 
banking fragility. Evidently, this very last inference indicates that prevention of banking 
crisis might become more likely to the extent that supervisory authorities adopt a more 
precautionary approach via intensifying on-site examinations. The recent financial turbulence 
suggests that the costs associated with the more vigorous implementation of a supervisory 
policy with a strong deterrent character may be more than outweighed by the benefits of 
safegurading the safety and soundness of the banking system.   
Concerning the rest of the control variables, our findings are close to expectations. A 
higher volume of liquid assets in bank portfolios reduces Z-scores and increases credit risk. 
This result is probably explained by the two mechanisms that have already been discussed 
above. First, banks that hold a high volume of liquid, low yield assets are less profitable; and 
second, a moral hazard mechanism may be prevail if liquidity requirements are in place. 
Bank size is positively related with the Z-index, yet its impact on credit risk is insignificant. 
This shows that larger banks are more profitable, presumably owing to economies of scale 
and/or market power,15 while the role of size in managing credit risk is negligible. As far as 
the macroeconomic variables are concerned, it appears that, in countries with a high level of 
development (i.e., high GDP per capita), banks are assigned with a higher Z-index with 
credit risk exposure being lower, while high inflation is associated with lower Z-scores and a 
high volume of non-performing loans. These results are intuitive considering that, in 
developed and financially stable countries, bank insolvency problems are less frequent and 
fewer resources are employed by banks to forecast the future levels of inflation.  
The basic specifications are augmented in columns IV and VIII by the regulatory 
variables. Apparently, our results seem to confirm that part of the research discussed in 
Section 2, which implies a negative correlation between disclosure requirements (mdisc) and 
bank risk-taking while casting doubt on the efficiency of capital regulation (caprq) as a 
disciplinary mechanism. This is not to say, of course, that capital adequacy requirements are 
redundant but rather that transparency regulation should come at the forefront of regulators’ 
and supervisors’ agendas, as it constitutes the prerequisite layer and supplement for effective 
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banking supervision (including supervision of capital requirements) and market discipline 
(Flannery and Thakor, 2006; Van Hoose, 2007). 
Our finding that regulatory restrictions on banking activities tend to reduce risk-
taking appear, on the one hand, to challenge the somewhat prevalent empirical view favoring 
the universal banking model (see the discussion above under 3.4), but, on the other hand, 
seem to be in harmony with those worried opinions suspecting that the Glass-Steagall repeal 
should also be partially blamed for the current financial turmoil (Kuttner, 2007; Zombanakis, 
2008; Kaufman, 2009). It is worth noting that in the relevant specifications the economic 
freedom variable is positively linked to the Z-index and negatively linked to npl. This 
insinuates that, when controlling for activity restrictions, increased economic freedom lowers 
bank risk, possibly owing to increased flows from abroad and better diversification of bank 
risk.16 
We conclude this section by using the second lags of the regulation variables instead 
of the first lags employed in the estimations so far. To save space, we do not include these 
results in Table 4 but we report the coefficients on the variables of main interest in the 
following equation (estimation method is GMM, dependent variable is the Z-index and t-
statistics are reported in parentheses): 
2
1 1 1
(8.25***) ( 2.28**) (2.85***) (2.39**) (0.82) (1.84*)
1
(2.98***)
0.381 0.363 1.867 0.091 0.193 0.411
      0.801  (p-values of tests are Wald: 0.000; A
it it t t t t t
t
r r audits sanctions audits caprq mdisc
actrs
− − −
−
−
= − + + + +
+ R1: 0.092; AR2: 0.025; Sargan: 0.183)
Obviously, the changes in the coefficients with respect to the specifications included in Table 
4 are negligible, while the same holds for the credit risk equation. This is probably due to the 
fact that there are only minor and gradual changes in the regulatory indices over time and 
therefore the length of the dynamics is not a crucial element in shaping bank risk.  
  
5. The combined effect of banking supervision and banking regulations on bank risk 
To answer the second question set out in Section 2, concerning the combined effect of 
supervisory effectiveness and banking regulations on bank risk-taking, we consider the 
following specification: 
1 1 2 3 1 4 1
5 1 6 7
*
      *
it it t t t t t
t t it t it
r r audits sanctions reg audits reg
sanctions reg b m u
α δ β β β β
β β β
− −
−
= + + + + + +
+ + +
−            (2) 
Unfortunately, the products of reg with audits and sanctions are highly multicollinear with 
the levels of these variables and cannot be included simultaneously in the regressions. This is 
a common problem among studies that employ interaction terms and can be partially solved 
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by “centering” the variables. Centering means computing the mean of each independent 
variable and then replacing each value with the difference between it and the mean. After 
centering the variables the correlation between the products and their levels falls below 0.50. 
Note that actrs is not interacted with the enforcement variables, since we are 
investigating whether and to what extent it is the effectiveness of banking supervision (Pillar 
2 of Basel II) in connection with two specific types of regulation constituting the other two 
pillars of Basel II, namely capital and disclosure regulation, that has a bearing on banking 
stability. The estimation results are reported in Table 5. The first three specifications 
correspond to Z-index regressions and the latter three to npl regressions. Given the results of 
the previous section, we resort only to equations that include the squared term of audits and 
we use the GMM method. Moreover, we only report estimates of the regulatory variables 
lagged once, as we did not find any changes in the results after using the second lags instead. 
Again, the Sargan test shows no overidentifying restrictions and the AR2 test no second 
order autocorrelation.  
We consider that our results not only shed some light on the discussion that led to 
Question 2 but are also particularly inspiring, pointing to a shift of regulatory and 
supervisory philosophy. More specifically, we find that the relationship between effective 
supervision of disclosure requirements (i.e., the product of mdisc with either audits or 
sanctions) and risk-taking is negative and statistically significant. This is in contrast to the 
combined effect of banking supervision and capital regulation (i.e., the product of caprq with 
either audits or sanctions), which appears insignificant. In addition, the direct impact of 
mdisc on bank risk is negative and significant, caprq remains insignificant (much like in 
Table 4) and the variables audits and sanctions have the same effect with the one reported in 
Table 4. Thus, in addition to the individual, direct effect of enforcement and market 
discipline on bank risk, there is also an amplifying combined effect of these variables. The 
results carry through irrespective of whether we include only the product of audits with reg 
(specifications I and IV), only the product of sanctions with reg (specifications II and V) or 
all products simultaneously (specifications III and VI).  
The findings imply that the regulatory and supervisory perseverance with capital vis a 
vis transparency regulation is unwarranted. By extension, our work appears to contradict the 
“conventional wisdom” – also reflected into Basel II – concerning the supremacy of capital 
regulation as a risk-control device and seem to be in line with the latest voices that emerged 
subsequent to the sub-prime crisis placing increasing weight upon more vigorous and better 
enforced transparency requirements (e.g., Financial Stability Forum, 2008; IOSCO, 2008; 
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Basel Committee, 2009; IMF, 2009). From this perspective, our research validates the 
criticism that Caprio et al. (2008) leveled against Basel II for devoting just “16 pages to 
issues of market discipline and 225 pages to spelling out formulas and strategies impeded in 
pillar one and options for national discretion authorized in pillar two”. 
The impact of the rest of the control variables is not altered compared with the results 
reported in Table 4. A notable exception is the impact of economic freedom, which is now 
positive and statistically significant in all the Z-index regressions and negative in the npl 
ones. Much like before, higher GDP per capita and lower inflation implies a less risky 
environment for banks. Finally, as regards the bank-level variables, high levels of liquid 
assets tend to lower profits and increase risk-taking, whereas size, once more, enters with a 
positive and significant coefficient in the Z-index regressions (negative and significant 
coefficient in the npl regressions).  
  
6. Conclusions 
As the recent subprime crisis unfolds, researchers and policy-makers are struggling to 
comprehend the causes and articulate exit plans. A proliferation of papers from diverse 
scientific fields has seen the light of publicity propagating the idea of another “New Deal”, of 
a novel “financial architecture”, the common denominator of all being encapsulated into two 
words: better – and in some cases more – regulation and supervision. 
 Inspired by the law and finance literature, our work approaches the problem posed by 
the triptych “banking regulation-supervision-risk” from a different and, we believe, more 
pragmatic angle. More specifically, we distinguish between banking regulation (i.e., law on 
the books) and supervision (i.e., actual implementation of law on the books) and move on to 
assess their individual/ stand-alone and combined effect on the risk-taking behaviour of 
banks. By placing emphasis on capital and transparency requirements as far as banking 
regulation is concerned, our work essentially offers an empirical assessment of the effect that 
the interplay among the three Basel II pillars (i.e., Pillar 1: capital requirements, Pillar 2: 
transparency/market discipline, Pillar 2: effective supervision) has upon banking fragility.  
Our innovation to measure supervisory effectiveness by using a panel of cross-country data 
on enforcement outputs (i.e., on-site audits and enforcement actions) provides us with the 
opportunity to approach the interrelation among regulation, supervision and risk in a more 
direct and realistic manner while also offering our work a dynamic character as it allows 
capturing the evolution-trend of the aforementioned relationship. 
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 We consider that the inferences of our analysis may be of particular value for 
regulators and supervisors alike, especially in the aftermath of the current financial turmoil. 
First, it appears that enforcement actions do exert a disciplinary power upon banks, while our 
finding on the inverted U-shaped relationship between on-site audits and banking fragility 
indicate that intensifying the frequency of examinations beyond a certain threshold may also 
constrain risk-taking. Second, from a regulatory point of view, we obtain evidence of a 
statistically significant, negative relationship between disclosure requirements and bank risk-
taking, whereas no such correlation is substantiated as far as capital regulation is concerned. 
On the same line, we conclude that strengthening banking supervision of transparency 
requirements offers an important apparatus against excessive risk-taking on the part of banks, 
while, by contrast, the combined effect of efficient banking supervision and capital 
requirements fails to provide statistically significant results. All in all, it seems not only that 
regulatory and supervisory persistence with capital adequacy constraints is rather 
unwarranted, but also that regulatory and supervisory agendas should be re-oriented placing 
more weight on the adoption and effective implementation of disclosure requirements. 
Essentially, therefore, our proposal for more transparency regulation and market discipline 
coincides with the recent comment made by Caprio et al. (2008) that the fundamental goal of 
supervisors should be to ensure that risks are fully understood and fairly priced by investors. 
Finally, our finding that regulations placing restrictions on banking activities are negatively 
correlated with risk-taking encourages the supporters of a Glass-Steagall-type regulation. 
 Our work might provide stimulus for further research and fine-tuning in many 
respects. To begin with, obtaining more data on enforcement outputs would allow the 
classification of our results according to legal origins (i.e., common law, civil law, German-
Scandinavian legal systems) and, thus, provide a more direct link and opportunity for 
interesting comparisons with the rest of the law and finance literature employing data from 
law on the books or questionnaires. Moreover, it would be interesting to look into the data on 
enforcement outputs and discern the areas of regulations enjoying less compliance, as well as 
categorize the types of enforcement actions taken by supervisors (e.g., criminal v. 
administrative proceedings) and assess their effect on risk-taking. Finally, after acquiring and 
elaborating data on private actions, it would also be interesting to assess their role as risk-
control devices and their interrelationship with public enforcement mechanisms (e.g. if and 
to what extent more and better supervised transparency regulation also facilitates the bringing 
of private actions). 
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Variable Category Description 
caprq Capital  
requirements 
This variable is determined by adding 1 if the answer is yes to questions 1-6 and 0 otherwise, while the opposite occurs in the 
case of questions 7 and 8 (i.e., yes=0, no =1). (1) Is the minimum required capital asset ratio risk-weighted in line with Basle 
guidelines? (2) Does the ratio vary with market risk? (3-5) Before minimum capital adequacy is determined, which of the 
following are deducted from the book value of capital:  (a) market value of loan losses not realized in accounting books? (b) 
unrealized losses in securities portfolios? (c) unrealized foreign exchange losses? (6) Are the sources of funds to be used as 
capital verified by the regulatory/supervisory authorities? (7) Can the initial or subsequent injections of capital be done with 
assets other than cash or government securities? (8) Can initial disbursement of capital be done with borrowed funds?  
mdisc Market 
discipline 
This variable is determined by adding 1 if the answer is yes to questions 1-7 and 0 otherwise, while the opposite occurs in the 
case of questions 8 and 9 (i.e., yes=0, no =1). (1) Is subordinated debt allowable (or required) as part of capital? (2) Are 
financial institutions required to produce consolidated accounts covering all bank and any non-bank financial subsidiaries? 
(3) Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to public? (4) Must banks disclose their risk management procedures to public? (5) 
Are directors legally liable for erroneous/misleading information? (6) Do regulations require credit ratings for commercial 
banks? (7) Is an external audit by certified/licensed auditor a compulsory obligation for banks? (8) Does accrued, though 
unpaid interest/principal enter the income statement while loan is non-performing? (9) Is there an explicit deposit insurance 
protection system? 
actrs Restrictions 
on banks 
activities 
The score for this variable is determined on the basis of the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank participation in: (1) 
securities activities (2) insurance activities (3) real estate activities (4) bank ownership of non-financial firms. These activities 
can be unrestricted, permitted, restricted or prohibited that are assigned the values of 1, 2, 3 or 4 respectively. We use an 
overall index by calculating the average value over the four categories.  
Note: The individual questions and answers were obtained from the World Bank database developed by Barth et al. (2001) and updated in more recent 
studies by the same authors.  
Appendix. Information on regulatory variables 
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Endnotes 
1 Intense financial innovation, excessive leverage, inadequate risk management systems, deficient 
accounting, capital adequacy and liquidity rules, defective corporate management compensation 
systems and loopholes in the regulation of influential market participants, like hedge funds and credit 
rating agencies, have all been recognized as features-failures of the existing financial architecture and 
held accountable for the unfolding market disorder. 
2 Our work clearly distinguishes between banking supervision and regulation. Regulation is taken to 
encompass formal rules that are adopted by an official, public authority (law on the books). Banking 
supervision is a much more complex concept comprising, in generic terms, two components. First, the 
so-called prudential supervision seeks to maintain stability and confidence in the banking system. This 
is achieved through a licensing system allowing supervisors to identify the population to be supervised 
and to control entry into the banking system. To obtain and maintain a license, banks need to abide by 
certain prudential requirements covering, inter alia, capital and liquidity adequacy, major shareholders’ 
and board directors’ suitability, the efficiency of organization and internal controls, as well as the 
appropriateness of legal structure. The second component refers to enforcement, that is, securing 
compliance with the legal framework on banks and their activities via the detection of violations and 
the imposition of remedial measures (Basel Committee, 2002).  
3 A different part of the literature deals with the relationship between deposit insurance and banks’ risk-
taking incentives (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002; Laeven and Levine, 2008). 
4 The work of Cordella and Yeyati (1998) and Bliss and Flannery (2002) could well be characterized as 
representing a more modest and compromised position between the two spectrums.  
5 The research of Calem and Rob (1999) and Laeven and Levine (2008) represent an attempt for 
reconciliation of the two opposing views.  
6 The number of both the supervised banks and the banks included in the sample naturally differs on a 
yearly basis. The full sample reporting the numbers on a yearly basis is available on request. 
7 The dataset of Barth et al. (2001, 2004, 2008) provides data concerning on site examinations only for 
specific years. As a result, it does not allow a study on the basis of panel data nor does it include data 
on sanctions. 
8 As noticed by Jackson and Roe (2008), a supervisor that enjoys wide investigatory powers may avoid 
making use of these powers in practice, thus displaying a low enforcement record. In this case, 
therefore, the “investigatory power” index based upon law on the books may well provide a flattering 
picture of supervisory effectiveness.  
9 The transition economies of our sample inherited a high volume of non-performing loans from the old 
centralized regime. For Korea and Hong Kong the 1997 financial crisis is responsible for the high 
values of non-performing loans observed at the beginning of the period. 
10 Descriptive statistics on a country basis for the bank-level variables are available on request. 
11 This approach has been also followed by Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005) and Pasiouras et al. (2006), 
among others. An alternative would be to use principal component analysis as in Beck et al. (2006). 
Barth et al. (2004) have followed both approaches, mentioning that, on the one hand, the drawback of 
using the summation for the construction of the index is that it assigns equal weight to each of the 
questions, whereas, on the other hand, the disadvantage of the first principal component is that it is less 
obvious how a change in the response to a question modifies the index. While they only report the 
empirical results on the basis of the latter approach, they mention (at p. 218) that “we have confirmed 
all this paper’s conclusions using both methods”.  
12 For more on these issues, see Nerlove (2002, 273-304). 
13 The variables reflecting different forms of regulation may be predetermined or endogenous 
depending on the sequence of events of the game played between banks and regulators. In particular, if 
banks observe the level and type of regulation and then choose their level of risk optimally, regulations 
should be treated as a predetermined variable. If regulations are indeed predetermined, then the first 
and longer lags of these variables are valid instruments. However, it may also be the case that in an 
effort to prevent financial turbulence, regulators enact new laws at the time they observe excess risk-
taking. To the extent that the risk-taking of banks explains bank regulatory initiatives of this kind, this 
will be reflected in our regulation indices of that particular year. Hence, as the treatment of the 
regulatory variables as endogenous encompasses their treatment as predetermined, we assume that 
caprq, mdisc and actrs are endogenous variables. For further discussion on these issues, see Bond 
(2002). 
14 These results are provided on request. 
15 Of course this holds to the extent that bank size is positively correlated with bank market power, 
which is another controversial discussion in banking surrounding the so-called structure-conduct-
performance and efficient-structure hypotheses.  
 30
16 Despite the fact that this is probably beyond the scope of the present analysis, we proceed a step 
further on this issue and examine whether the negative relationship between activity restrictions and 
bank risk holds regardless of the level of economic freedom of the countries in our sample. Therefore, 
we additionally estimate an equation that includes an interaction term between the variables actrs and 
economic freedom. The results (with the Z-index as dependent variable) suggest that the higher the 
economic freedom in a country, the less significant the impact of activity restrictions on bank risk. 
However, we leave it for future research to identify separately the two effects of activity restrictions, as 
set out in Section 3.4 above, and which one prevails in countries characterized by higher or lower 
economic freedom.  
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Table 1 
Supervisory authorities and average on-site audits and sanctions per bank 
 
Sample countries 
Supervisory authorities responsible 
for the conduct of banking 
supervision 
Audits 
per 
bank 
Sanctions 
per bank 
Average 
No. of 
supervised 
banks 
Average 
No. of 
banks in 
the sample 
Australia Australian Prudential Regulation Authority  0.836 0.060 248.1 205.3 
Bulgaria Bulgarian National Bank 0.606 0.664 33.6 28.3 
Czech Republic Czech National Bank 0.296 0.350 42.1 34.1 
Germany 
(a) Bundesaufsichtsamt für das 
Kreditwesen  
(b) Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 
0.151 0.021 2586.2 2121.0 
Greece Bank of Greece 3.519 0.418 61.8 49.7 
Hong Kong Hong Kong Monetary Authority 1.096 0.061 237.9 210.3 
Korea Financial Supervisory Service 10.330 3.450 59.3 50.1 
Latvia Financial and Capital Market Commission 1.332 0.248 23.4 19.4 
Luxembourg Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier 0.254 1.085 178.5 158.4 
Portugal Banco de Portugal 0.290 0.139 64.5 60.2 
Romania National Bank of Romania 1.356 0.591 40.2 34.7 
Russia Central Bank of the Russian Federation 1.551 1.119 1839.9 1651.2 
Serbia (a) National Bank of Yugoslavia (b) National Bank of Serbia 0.590 0.804 42.5 40.1 
Spain Banco de Espaňa  1.572 0.047 358.9 307.7 
Turkey 
(a) Bankacilik Düzenleme ve 
Denetleme Kurumu 
(b) Banking Regulation and 
Supervision Agency 
3.735 1.086 73.9 68.5 
Ukraine National Bank of Ukraine 4.365 0.187 162.4 145.3 
USA 
(a) Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency 
(b) Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation 
(c) Federal Reserve Board 
0.741  1.284 11298.2 8022.7 
Notes: The table lists the supervisory authorities of the countries included in our sample and reports the 
average number of audits and sanctions per bank during the sample period. The table also reports the 
average total number of supervised banks in each country during the sample period and the average actual 
number of banks used in this study. 
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Table2 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Z-index 3.810 1.308 -1.223 9.813 
npl 0.023 0.045 0.004 0.401 
audits 1.700 2.623 0.086 20.254 
sanctions 0.639 0.895 0.000 5.278 
liquidity 0.043 0.051 0.003 0.482 
bank size 13.010 3.031 10.150 20.171 
ecfreedom 65.621 11.857 45.700 90.600 
gdpcap 13908.9 13855.8 591.0 54482.1 
inflation 10.051 15.919 -6.152 88.023 
caprq 5.219 1.277 2.000 8.000 
mdisc 6.106 1.019 4.000 8.000 
actrs 2.169 0.520 1.250 3.250 
Notes: The table reports basic descriptive statistics for the 
variables used in the empirical analysis. The variables are 
defined as follows: Z-index is defined as 
ln[Z=(ROA+EA)/σ(ROA)], where ROA is the ratio of profits 
before tax to total assets and EA is the ratio of equity to total 
assets; npl is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans; 
audits is the number of on-site audits per bank in each year; 
sanctions is the number of sanctions per bank in each year; 
liquidity is the ratio of liquid bank assets to total assets; bank 
size is measured by the natural logarithm of total bank assets; 
ecfreedom is the composite index of economic freedom 
obtained from the Heritage Foundation; gdpcap is the natural 
logarithm of GDP per capita of the country; inflation is the 
inflation rate (CPI) of each country; caprq is the Barth et al. 
(2001) index of capital requirements; mdisc is the Barth et al. 
(2001) index of market discipline; actrs is the Barth et al. 
(2001) index of activity restrictions. 
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Table 3 
Correlations between the explanatory variables 
 
  audits sanctions liquidity size ecfreedom gdpcap inflation caprq mdisc actrs 
audits 1.000          
sanctions 0.456 1.000         
liquidity -0.047 0.067 1.000        
bank size -0.017 0.190 -0.123 1.000       
ecfreedom -0.139 -0.198 -0.533 -0.023 1.000      
gdpcap -0.125 -0.152 -0.526 0.021 0.567 1.000     
inflation 0.067 0.090 0.307 0.189 -0.482 -0.503 1.000    
caprq -0.337 0.112 0.199 0.090 -0.002 0.014 -0.130 1.000   
mdisc 0.288 -0.248 -0.377 -0.112 0.423 0.334 -0.307 0.034 1.000  
actrs 0.157 0.109 0.157 0.175 -0.172 -0.167 0.218 -0.282 -0.089 1.000 
Notes: The table reports correlation coefficients between the independent variables used in the empirical analysis. The variables are 
defined as follows: audits is the number of on-site audits per bank in each year; sanctions is the number of sanctions per bank in each 
year; liquidity is the ratio of liquid bank assets to total assets; bank size is measured by the natural logarithm of total bank assets; 
ecfreedom is the composite index of economic freedom obtained from the Heritage Foundation; gdpcap is the natural logarithm of 
GDP per capita of the country; inflation is the inflation rate (CPI); caprq is the Barth et al. (2001) index of capital requirements; 
mdisc is the Barth et al. (2001) index of market discipline; actrs is the Barth et al. (2001) index of activity restrictions. 
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Table 4 
The direct effect of on-site audits and sanctions on bank risk 
 
  I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
  Z-index Z-index Z-index Z-index npl npl npl npl 
lagged dependent  0.342 0.371 0.364  0.449*** 0.483*** 0.453*** 
  (7.11) (7.98) (7.91)  (8.56) (10.11) (10.22) 
audits -0.301* 0.123 -0.362** -0.360** 0.276 0.493** 1.009*** 1.141*** 
 (-1.70) (0.95) (-2.23) (-2.15) (1.20) (2.49) (4.03) (4.44) 
sanctions 1.773** 1.816*** 1.891*** 1.895*** -0.153 -1.282** -1.299** -1.100** 
 (2.33) (2.69) (3.27) (3.41) (-0.18) (-2.40) (-2.55) (-2.28) 
audits squared   0.083** 0.085**   -0.245*** -0.233*** 
   (2.12) (2.21)   (-3.09) (-3.01) 
liquidity -0.037 -0.070** -0.071** -0.071** 0.226*** 0.061** 0.060** 0.066** 
 (-1.63) (-2.43) (-2.47) (-2.46) (2.84) (2.39) (2.34) (2.53) 
bank size 0.085** 0.096*** 0.096*** 0.098*** -0.020 -0.033 -0.037* -0.041* 
 (2.34) (3.10) (3.11) (3.23) (-0.81) (-1.67) (-1.74) (-1.82) 
ecfreedom -0.004 -0.013 -0.014 0.063** 0.094 -0.011 0.010 -0.192** 
 (-0.07) (-0.64) (-0.67) (2.61) (0.57) (-0.13) (0.14) (-2.58) 
gdpcap 0.496 3.026*** 3.014*** 3.001*** -15.403*** -5.773*** -5.597*** -5.179*** 
 (0.35) (3.16) (3.03) (2.74) (-3.78) (-7.18) (-7.31) (-7.55) 
inflation 0.010 -0.045** -0.047** -0.051** 0.167*** 0.141*** 0.103*** 0.169*** 
 (0.62) (-1.99) (-2.08) (-2.30) (2.68) (4.01) (3.07) (5.82) 
caprq    0.201    0.114 
    (0.79)    (0.37) 
mdisc    0.407*    -0.566* 
    (1.81)    (-1.91) 
actrs    0.830***    -2.680*** 
    (3.31)    (-3.46) 
R-squared 0.298       0.425       
Fixed effects 0.000    0.000    
Wald-test  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR1  0.093 0.101 0.087  0.072 0.069 0.088 
AR2  0.021 0.027 0.032  0.001 0.003 0.011 
Sargan   0.168 0.172 0.169   0.361 0.228 0.216 
Notes: The table presents estimations on the relationship between risk, on-site audits and sanctions. Estimation method is 
OLS (with fixed effects) for specifications I and V and dynamic panel GMM for the rest. In specifications I, II, III and IV 
the dependent variable is the Z-index and in specifications V, VI, VII and VIII the ratio of nonperforming loans to total 
loans (npl). The explanatory variables are defined as follows: audits is the number of on-site audits per bank in each year; 
sanctions is the number of sanctions per bank in each year; liquidity is the ratio of liquid bank assets to total assets; bank 
size is the natural logarithm of total bank assets; ecfreedom is the composite index of economic freedom obtained from 
the Heritage Foundation; gdpcap is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita of the country; inflation is the inflation rate 
(CPI) of each country; caprq is the Barth et al. (2001) index of capital requirements; mdisc is the Barth et al. (2001) index 
of market discipline; actrs is the Barth et al. (2001) index of activity restrictions. The table reports coefficients with t-
statistics in parentheses, the R-squared and Fixed effects (p-value) tests (the latter two for the panel OLS regressions), the 
Wald test of the joint significance of the coefficients (p-value), the tests for first (AR1) and second (AR2) order 
autocorrelation and the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per 
cent, respectively.  
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Table 5 
The combined effect of regulation and enforcement on bank risk-taking 
 
  I II III IV V VI 
  Z-index Z-index Z-index npl npl npl 
lagged dependent 0.328*** 0.341*** 0.334*** 0.388*** 0.401*** 0.449*** 
 (6.25) (6.89) (6.40) (9.72) (10.20) (10.73) 
audits -0.387** -0.391** -0.392** 3.269*** 3.254*** 3.205** 
 (-2.45) (-2.51) (-2.53) (2.86) (2.79) 2.68 
sanctions 1.881*** 1.864*** 1.872*** -0.820** -0.817** -0.820** 
 (3.10) (2.98) (3.05) (-2.32) (-2.23) (-2.37) 
audits squared 0.097** 0.102** 0.103** -0.046*** -0.041*** -0.045*** 
 (2.55) (2.60) (2.62) (-3.19) (2.82) (-3.21) 
liquidity -0.071** -0.073** -0.073 0.065** 0.064** 0.065** 
 (-2.50) (-2.55) (-2.56) (2.40) (2.35) (2.42) 
bank size 0.098*** 0.097*** 0.098*** -0.039* -0.040* -0.033 
 (3.13) (3.11) (3.12) (-1.83) (-1.86) (-1.65) 
ecfreedom 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.072*** -0.201** -0.217** -0.220** 
 (2.71) (2.70) (2.73) (-2.48) (-2.61) (-2.65) 
gdpcap 3.001*** 3.012*** 3.011*** -5.145*** -5.105*** -5.133*** 
 (3.10) (3.15) (3.15) (-7.03) (-6.32) (-6.71) 
inflation -0.047** -0.052** -0.048** 0.165*** 0.167*** 0.166*** 
 (-2.09) (-2.14) (-2.09) (5.10) (5.23) (5.20) 
caprq 0.252 0.214 0.227 -0.121 -0.015 -0.120 
 (0.91) (0.83) (0.85) (-0.69) (0.05) (-0.71) 
mdisc 0.623** 0.639** 0.638** -0.787** -0.780** -0.792** 
 (2.18) (2.27) (2.27) (-2.33) (-2.25) (-2.41) 
actrs 0.912** 0.921** 0.916** -2.550*** -2.562*** -2.573*** 
 (2.45) (2.51) (2.48) (-3.12) (-3.41) (-3.59) 
audits*caprq -0.026  0.031 -0.133  -0.146 
 (-0.10)  (0.17) (-1.10)  (-1.31) 
audits*mdisc 0.827**  0.815* -0.367***  -0.381*** 
 (1.98)  (1.85) (-2.85)  (-2.95) 
sanctions*caprq  0.330 0.345  -0.180 -0.321 
  (0.72) (0.79)  (-0.60) (-0.87) 
sanctions*mdisc  0.986*** 1.003***  -1.826*** -1.877*** 
  (2.91) (3.00)  (-3.44) (-3.61) 
Wald-test 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR1 0.103 0.091 0.093 0.135 0.122 0.147 
AR2 0.027 0.031 0.029 0.040 0.033 0.041 
Sargan 0.207  0.301  0.286  0.224 0.205 0.219 
Notes: The table presents estimations on the relationship between risk, on-site audits and sanctions. Estimation 
method is GMM for dynamic panels. In specifications I, II and III the dependent variable is the Z-index and in 
specifications IV, V and VI the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans (npl).  The explanatory variables are 
defined as follows: audits is the number of on-site audits per bank in each year; sanctions is the number of sanctions 
per bank in each year; liquidity is the ratio of liquid bank assets to total assets; bank size is the natural logarithm of 
total bank assets; ecfreedom is the composite index of economic freedom obtained from the Heritage Foundation; 
gdpcap is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita of the country; inflation is the inflation rate (CPI) of each country; 
caprq is the Barth et al. (2001) index of capital requirements; mdisc is the Barth et al. (2001) index of market 
discipline; actrs is the Barth et al. (2001) index of activity restrictions. The table reports coefficients with t-statistics 
in parentheses, the Wald test of the joint significance of the coefficients (p-value), the tests for first (AR1) and second 
(AR2) order autocorrelation and the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions. *, ** and *** denote significance at 
the 10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively.  
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